Causes and legacy of the dioxin crisis in Belgium

Twenty-five years ago, in 1999, Belgium was rocked by the dioxin crisis, a major food scandal just weeks before the elections. The crisis had profound implications for Belgium’s agricultural sector and food safety management, but its effects were even more far-reaching. It influenced political dynamics, particularly in Flanders, eroded trust in the food industry, and highlighted the activity of the media and their influence on events during a political or food crisis. This article is based on an online seminar organized by CAG and ICAG (in Dutch) and delves into the lasting legacy of Belgium's most significant food crisis through contemporary reports, newspaper articles, and interviews with key figures.

1990-2010. © Boerenbond. KADOC-KU Leuven.

The dioxin crisis in a nutshell

In January 1999, dioxins, harmful environmental pollutants, entered the food chain. This contamination was traced back to a fat-rendering company that included transformer oil in their product, which was then used in animal feed. This issue was first noticed by poultry farmers, who reported unusual health problems with their chickens to their feed company in January of that year. Internal investigations identified dioxins as the likely cause, although it was only confirmed in March. 

It was at this moment that the Ministry of Agriculture was informed and began an investigation which revealed that the fat-rendering company used falsified documents and improper labelling of fats. The fat used as a core ingredient for animal feed was widely dispersed to poultry and pig farmers, but it was especially the poultry farmers who reported the most extreme effects; young chicks which failed to hatch and those that did, often grew sick and demonstrated a lack of nerval functions.

© Boerenbond. KADOC-KU Leuven.

However, the crisis showed that there was no adequate response to react swiftly to the situation. Although dioxins had been in the food chain since at least late January, the government's response was slow. Cooperation between the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Health was necessary because of the diffusion of different responsibilities, but due to poor agreement and mutual mistrust and competition, the flow of information went completely awry.

By late April, coordination between the Ministries of Agriculture and Public Health was set up. Measures included blocking suspicious companies and tracing contaminated food. Again, both ministries struggled in their efforts to trace the dioxins through the various stages within the food chain, as there were no mechanisms in place to do so. Everything had to be followed through manually in cooperation with various companies and farmers. Different tests were needed for official confirmation that there were indeed dioxins within the whole food chain, and within a few days the public broadcaster had revealed the contamination to the public, via its television journal. This occurred only two weeks before the federal elections, making politicians and policy makers nervous about the impact of their decisions.

European Commissioner for Agriculture Fischler, Federal Minister of Agriculture Karel Pinxten and Chief of Cabinet Piet Vanthemsche. © Landbouwleven, 1998.

The government was taken by surprise, since it had failed to map the scale of the contamination from the moment it had become public. Not all information was yet available, making it hard to communicate thoroughly. It was decided that all poultry products should be taken out of Belgian supermarkets until the contamination had been traced back to its source, leading to empty shelves in supermarkets. The lack of transparency and information sparked a food panic in the first days and weeks following.

© Het Volk. KADOC-KU Leuven.

Political and economic consequences

It was clear that bad governance over food sources and health and safety had impacted on the general public, leading to a general mistrust of the government. The crisis had severe political consequences, resulting in the resignation of the ministers of Agriculture and Public Health. The CVP lost the elections and for the first time since 1958, a government emerged without the Christian Democrats in attendance, but with Liberals, Socialists and Greens. Guy Verhofstadt became Belgium's prime minister for the first time, and he immediately had to try to rein in the crisis.

The economic repercussions for Belgium’s agricultural sector were severe: around 7 million chickens and 60,000 pigs had to be culled. Thousands of farms were blocked for months, and slaughterhouses faced significant challenges. Initially, a slaughter ban left thousands of workers without jobs, followed by a surge of animals needing to be ‘disposed of’. Several incidents were reported during the slaughter ban of animal suffocation in overcrowded stalls. In June 1999, the entire food industry saw a 14% production drop, with the meat sector experiencing a decline of over 40%. The secondary processing industries also suffered, with the crisis causing a national economic slowdown of approximately 0.2%.

Farmers' demonstration in Brussels in response to the dioxin crisis. © Landbouwleven.

Empty store shelves became the emblem of the dioxin crisis, directly affecting consumers. After chickens and eggs, derivative products like mayonnaise and cookies were also impacted. International markets quickly followed suit, halting exports. The poultry and broader agricultural sectors were hard-hit. When newly appointed Health Minister Luc Van Den Bossche (SP) decided to remove pork from around 500 suspect farms from shelves in early June 1999, the damage to the reputation of Belgian agriculture was immense. Even Belgian chocolates and pralines, largely unaffected by the contamination, were removed from shelves in various countries.

Initially, poultry farmers called for clarity. The general blockades on entire product groups were met with little understanding. Products that could not be contaminated, such as those from organically fed animals or feed purchased abroad, were also blocked. The situation quickly became unsustainable as the livestock farming cycle was disrupted, leading to overfilled stalls and animal deaths. Since the crisis stemmed from fraud rather than force majeure, European support was not readily available. As the crisis prolonged, discontent among farmers grew. On July 5, various agricultural organizations held a demonstration in Brussels to convince consumers that quality and food safety were their priorities. However, the protest was marred by scuffles which targeted the press, seen as partly to blame for the crisis and its reputational damage.

Empty shelves. © Het Volk. KADOC-KU Leuven.

The crisis and its legacy

The dioxin crisis led some consumers to make more conscious choices. Several initiatives capitalized on this shift, with newspapers featuring ads for safe alternatives like rabbit and fish. The media also temporarily focused more on organic farming, which had been growing since the early 1990s but was still in its infancy in 1999. The crisis coincided with Organic Farming Week, providing an opportunity for organic farmers to promote their products. While consumption of organic food increased during the initial weeks of the crisis, most consumers eventually reverted to their usual eating habits.

© Boerenbond. KADOC – KU Leuven.

The fragmented nature of the various agricultural authorities and their differing responsibilities when it came to policy making significantly complicated management of the crises. The Lambermont Agreement (2000-2001) provided for further regionalisation of agricultural policy from 2002. Henceforth, regions had the primary voice in agricultural policy debates, with the federal minister representing regional positions on the international level. 

The dioxin crisis was a pivotal event that led to significant changes in food safety policy in Belgium and the European Union. It directly prompted the creation of the Federal Agency for the Safety of the Food Chain (FAVV) in Belgium. This agency was conceived to address the fragmented responsibilities and poor information flow between the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Health. About 1,000 staff members from both ministries were reassigned to the FAVV, which operates based on three core principles: risk assessment, risk management, and risk communication.

From now on, every step in the production process had to be traceable flawlessly. © Boerenbond. KADOC – KU Leuven.

A key issue during the dioxin crisis was the lack of precise traceability for contaminated food products. Although the SANITEL protocol, established in 1992, provided traceability for beef, it was only extended to pigs in 1995 and then to poultry in 1999 in response to the crisis. The crisis also highlighted the risks posed by external inputs, leading to the CONSUM plan’s approval in late 1999. This plan aimed to monitor primary raw materials throughout the production chain to enable early detection and swift responses to contamination. It includes a global traceability system, business-level monitoring, and an emergency response plan.

The dioxin crisis and the earlier BSE crisis also influenced European Union policies. The EU published the White Paper on Food Safety in January 2000 as a direct consequence to enhance and update food legislation, aiming to restore consumer confidence through clearer and more transparent regulations. This led to the establishment of the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) in 2002, which is responsible for risk assessment and communication regarding food safety, although it does not have enforcement powers. The EU’s food and agricultural policies now heavily emphasise the farm-to-fork principle, which remains a cornerstone of its approach to food safety and agricultural regulation.

Logo EFSA. © EFSA.

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